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Abstract
According to the United Nations, education is a right to which all human beings are entitled. Since 
2000, the UN has been promoting the Millennium Development Goal to achieve free universal pri-
mary education for all, regardless of gender, by 2015. If the UN is correct to suggest that education is 
both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing other human rights, then there is 
an important need to question the role that governments should play to support the institutional 
reforms necessary to achieve basic primary education for all. Moreover, there is an important need to 
question the role all individuals should play to ensure that the institutional structure dedicated to the 
provision of basic primary education is set up not only to provide children with access to a vague 
notion of education but to a notion of basic education that can provide children with the freedom to 
do something with that education once they have obtained it.
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Human rights advocates claim that every child has a right to education. This claim is based primarily on two premises. First, rights advocates 
endorse the right to education because they believe that if children 
receive basic primary education, they will likely be literate and 
numerate and will have the basic social and life skills necessary to 
secure a job, to be an active member of a peaceful community, and 
to have a fulfilling life. Second, rights advocates recognize that, 
despite this recognition of education as a right by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), for example, many 
children fail to benefit from even basic primary education. This gap 
between the positive recognition of the right to education and the 
negative reality facing many children has led rights advocates to 
conclude that education must be considered a human rights issue 
on par with the right to food or the right to freedom. And as such, 
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to achieve universal 
primary education by 2015 was established to fight for the right for 
all children everywhere, regardless of gender, to a complete course 
of basic primary schooling. This is a goal that the 2010 Education 
for All report clearly indicates has achieved some progress 
(Watkins, 2010). According to this report, the number of children 
out of school has dropped by 33 million worldwide since 1999, the 
gender gap is narrowing in many countries, and the adult literacy 
rate has increased (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012). 
Nevertheless, in 2009 a total of 67 million children of primary 
school age still do not (or cannot) attend school (Naidoo, Saihjee, & 
Motivans, 2011; UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2005; Watkins, 
2010). The EFA team projects this number to remain unacceptably 
high at around 56 million by 2015 if the current status quo is 
maintained. Moreover, there are many who would suggest that 
while education is certainly important for children, it is not 
something that should necessarily be free, compulsory, public, or 
perhaps even a justified entitlement (e.g., Farson, 1974; Holt, 1964, 
1967, 1974; Narveson, 2001, 2002; Purdy, 1992; O’Neill, 1988). This 
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leads one to question, as representatives of organizations such as 
the UN (Tomasevski, 2005) and UNESCO (Report, 2002) have 
posed: What does having a right to education mean?
The standard definition of a right is “a justified claim on 
someone, or on some institution, for something which one is 
owed” (Orend, 2002, p. 17). For someone to claim a right to 
education, on this definition, suggests that there is a reason for that 
individual to claim entitlement and, similarly, there is a reason for 
someone else to honor this claim. So, what reason exists for the 
claim that an individual is entitled to an education and that others 
are responsible for honoring this claim? In the case of pure 
contractual arrangements, it is easy to provide reasons for such 
entitlements. I, as a customer, have paid for the services of a tutor, 
and the tutor, as a provider of teaching services, is obliged to tutor 
me. If either party fails to fulfill the obligations, there are estab-
lished legal and social conventions for protection. Similarly, if I am 
a citizen of a country (a democratic one, at least), whose constitu-
tional arrangements include the provision of basic schooling, the 
government, whose duty it is to carry out the constitutional 
provisions, is obliged to provide me with that service. The sugges-
tion that a right to education is a human right, however, stakes a 
stronger claim on moral grounds, not purely conventional ones 
and, as such, elevates the right to education to what Orend referred 
to as, “a high- priority claim or authoritative entitlement, justified 
by sufficient reasons, to a set of objects that are owed to each 
human person as a matter of minimally decent treatment” (Orend, 
2002, p. 34). To accept that the right to education is such a human 
right requires the need to establish what qualifies education as an 
object in the set of vitally needed material goods, personal free-
doms, and secure protections that rights advocates claim each 
individual is owed.
Defending every child’s right to education is one way to 
advance every child’s chance to get at least a minimal level of 
protection and support as that child develops. It is an inert claim, 
however, to state that a child has a right to education if there are no 
means for that child to realize this claim. And as Orend recom-
mended, “We do not know the full scope of our human rights until 
we know that the duties correlative to them can be performed at a 
reasonable cost” (Orend, 2002, p. 139). Providing children with 
educational opportunities can be expensive and, clearly, children 
(particularly young children) do not have the means to provide 
such resources for themselves. As a result, not only must consider-
ation be given to what qualifies an object like education as a 
high- priority claim or human right, consideration must also be 
given to the social context necessary to acknowledge this claim and 
to accept the social cost to implement it (Orend, 2006). With this 
in mind, this paper first qualifies education as a human right. 
Second, it qualifies the kind of social context required to ensure 
that every child’s right to basic primary education is both meaning-
ful and manageable. And finally, this paper offers policy implica-
tions regarding the implementation of education as a human right 
in the 21st century.
Education Qualified as a Human Right
Education is an institution that typically is established through a 
collective social desire to have civil and supportive societies. And if 
one considers the social dynamic found in many countries around 
the world, there is the suggestion that usually the more education 
people have, the better off they can be. With this in mind, many 
societies traditionally view education (at least primary and 
secondary education) as a genuine public good that adults and 
educators provide for children until such time that they outgrow 
their childhood vulnerabilities and inexperience to become 
contributing members of society themselves. Many existing 
international laws and UN documents have been created to 
promote and to protect this notion of education like the UDHR, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC).1 These documents have helped to establish viable legal 
mechanisms from which nation- states can and have implemented, 
supported, and assessed effective social structures necessary to 
provide for appropriate educational opportunities. Consider for 
example, Article 13 (1) of the ICESCR, which stipulates:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to 
the full development of the human personality and the sense of its 
dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable 
all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all 
racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the 
United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
This stipulation highlights the need to recognize, beyond a 
loose symbolic suggestion, not only the fundamental nature of 
having a right to education but also the instrumental and intrinsic 
value of this right. Consider also Article 28 (1) of the CRC, which 
builds upon the ICESCR by stipulating:
States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a 
view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal 












reduction of drop- out rates.
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Further, Article 29 of the CRC stipulates the need to recognize 
both the human dignity and the inalienable rights of each child and 
the need to establish appropriate educational environments capable 
of promoting and modeling this as well. By focusing on the need to 
develop the diverse, evolving abilities of each child, these articles 
stipulate the importance of promoting and protecting an educa-
tional environment that strives to balance the child’s ability with 
the child’s familial and cultural identity and to be directly relevant 
to the child’s socioeconomic circumstances.
While Articles 28 and 29 are dedicated most directly to 
education, four other articles in the CRC round out the need to 
establish an educational environment that is both rights respecting 
and child friendly. Article 2, for example, specifies the importance 
of respecting and ensuring the rights of all children regardless of 
background, ability, sex, or any other factor that might distinguish 
one child from the next. This is a stipulation that is particularly 
important when it comes to the education of girls in the developing 
world (e.g., UNESCO, 2009), and the education of racial and ethnic 
minorities in the developed world (e.g., Dickinson, 2004; Miller, 
1987, 1996; O’Connor, 2000). Article 3 stipulates the best interests of 
the child should be the primary concern of all actions and decisions 
that may affect that child’s life. To ensure that educational decisions 
are made in the best interests of the child, however, it is necessary 
for the child to be a participant in that decision- making process, 
not necessarily as an equal participant but as an age- appropriate 
contributor. Article 5 addresses the need to consider the significant 
role parental guidance can play in influencing the development of 
the child. The family, both the immediate and the extended 
community family, can and should be allowed to contribute 
positively to the evolving capacities of children, a condition that 
complements Article 6 and its stipulation that the child has an 
inherent right to life and to healthy development. These four 
articles, in conjunction with Articles 28 and 29, suggest that to 
realize the full rights a child is entitled to as a member of the human 
family, a holistic approach must be taken that recognizes the 
interconnected nature of this convention and, above all, the objects 
it specifies as necessary for a child to live a minimally decent life.
To complement the need to establish an educational environ-
ment that is child friendly, additional articles support the child’s 
right to an educational environment that is also empowering. 
Article 12, for example, stresses the rights of those children capable 
of forming their own views to express those views when they are 
relevant to decisions that affect them directly. In accordance with 
appropriate consideration of the child’s age and maturity, adults 
should give children the opportunity to participate in school life, 
including involvement in the creation of student councils, peer- 
mentoring programs, and the creation of curriculum materials that 
are both meaningful and relevant to their interests and experiences. 
The CRC also recognizes that having a voice is a meaningless 
entitlement if there is not a corresponding entitlement for children 
to access information freely. Article 17, for example, highlights both 
the importance of access to information, as well as the importance 
of access to information that remains open and flexible. Article 17 
(a), in particular, highlights the value to be gained by encouraging 
the mass media to disseminate information and material of social 
and cultural benefit to the child and in accordance with the spirit of 
Article 29. Article 17 (b) maintains the desire to advance intercul-
tural understanding and education through international coopera-
tion in the production, exchange and dissemination of such 
information and material from a diversity of cultural, national and 
international sources. Finally, Article 17 (e) reinforces the impor-
tance of recognizing that any rights granted to children must also 
account for the role parents play in the upbringing and develop-
ment of their own children and the role public authorities, as 
stipulated in their laws, play in the protection and promotion of 
public order and national security. That is, the CRC recognizes the 
role the state must play in enabling children/families to develop 
their own cultural identities freely and fully while, at the same time, 
recognizing the role children/families play in the establishment of a 
peaceful and stable society. To do this is to recognize, as the UN 
does, that a right to education “goes beyond formal schooling to 
embrace the broad range of life experiences and learning processes 
which enable children, individually and collectively, to develop 
their personalities, talents and abilities and to live a full and 
satisfying life within society” (UN, 2001, “Appendix,” p. 2). To 
uphold these goals of the CRC is to make a commitment to prepare 
children to live an individual life in society in the spirit of the ideals 
found in the UDHR and to provide children with a child- centered, 
child- friendly, and empowering educational environment.
While many countries (160 parties, as of December 10, 2012) 
have agreed to the principles embodied in the ICESCR (UN 
General Assembly, 1966), and most UN- recognized countries (193 
parties, as of December 10, 2012) have agreed to the principles 
embodied in the CRC (UN General Assembly, 1989), the demand-
ing nature of these stipulations has left doubt in the minds of many 
about the feasibility— the actual attainability— of a universal 
human right to free and compulsory basic primary education. One 
notable case in point is the United States, which has signed the CRC 
but has yet to ratify this treaty. To further qualify education as a 
human right outside of these codified national and international 
legal documents, it would be important to shift the existing robust 
worldwide commitment from the idea that children require special 
consideration of their right to have an education to a robust 
worldwide commitment to public action, which supports and 
sustains this right.
One of the most famous and influential articulations on the 
concept of social institutions and the need for a basic structure of 
society comes from John Rawls’s magnum opus Theory of Justice 
(Rawls, 1971) and his later work Political Liberalism (Rawls, 1996). 
According to Rawls, the basic structure of society can be defined as 
“the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one 
system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and 
shape the division of advantages that arise through social coopera-
tion” (Rawls, 1996, p. 258). Rawls posited that, if people were given 
the blanket protection of a rational, mutually- disinterested persona 
(a veil of ignorance), they would be able to design a social structure 
in which all could live at least a minimally decent life once the veil is 
lifted (Rawls, 1971). From this state of ignorance, Rawls contended, 
rational individuals will choose two foundational principles 
necessary to shape a just society. First is the liberty principle, which 
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states: “Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compat-
ible with the same scheme of liberties for all.” Second is the 
difference principle, which states: “Social and economic inequali-
ties are to satisfy two conditions: first they are to be attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of 
the least- advantaged members of society” (Rawls, 2001, pp. 
42– 43).2 He suggested that these two principles of justice will be 
selected because when biasing information is not available, 
rational agents will opt for a risk- averse distribution of fair and 
equitable treatment. He asserted this because he believed that 
reasonable individuals will not be willing to risk themselves not 
having at least a basic minimum set of social essentials or primary 
goods from which to pursue freely the things in life they wish to 
pursue (Orend, 2002, pp. 82– 87). Although education is not the 
primary focus of Rawls’s work, education is one of the primary 
social institutions that he includes as an essential component in a 
just society. Moreover, given that children represent a large 
majority of those who are within the group of the least advantaged 
members of society, it would seem that defending a child’s right to 
education is both reasonable and rational.
Of course, while this Rawlsian understanding of the role of 
education in society provides a justifying framework for establish-
ing education as a public good within a particular society, it fails to 
provide a satisfying justification for why society in general should 
actively support education as a human right as stipulated in 
documents like the ICESCR or the CRC, or why it is important to 
support the MDG to achieve free and universal basic primary 
education for all by 2015. To address this, we should consider 
another influential voice on the design of just social institutions: 
Thomas Pogge. Pogge reiterated Rawls’s belief that it is the design 
of social institutions that determine whether people get the objects 
of their vital needs (Pogge, 2002, especially ch. 2). Like Rawls, 
Pogge is interested in analyzing social institutions and in establish-
ing how such an analysis can be used to justify the need for reform 
when these institutions are demonstrably unjust. Pogge recom-
mended that it would be more beneficial to adapt Rawls’s theory of 
justice to the complexities of the real world, however, which is 
interconnected and global in scope (Pogge, 1988). Thus, Pogge 
importantly expanded upon the Rawlsian framework to recom-
mend that it is no longer possible to limit ourselves to well- ordered 
ideal societies and to the provision of primary goods through 
well- organized social institutions as defended by Rawls. Pogge 
argued instead that given our interconnectedness it is vital that we 
broaden this notion to embrace the more global concept of human 
rights. Moreover, he favored a concept of human rights that is not 
bound by the historically arbitrary national boarders or govern-
mental bodies found in the Rawlsian Law of Peoples— for Pogge, 
human rights belong to humanity (Pogge, 1994). As such, the force 
of human rights comes not from legal or political compulsion but 
from moral compulsion— only if the legal lines up with the moral, 
so to speak. While acknowledging legal rights and enforceable 
obligations are important advancements in our understanding of 
natural law and natural rights, he argued that even “human rights 
lawyers can acknowledge that the legal rights and obligations they 
draft and interpret are meant to give effect to pre- existing moral 
rights” (Pogge, 2002, p. 53).
This is a significant qualification because, as Pogge explained, 
human rights claims should be viewed as ethical guidelines for the 
actions of all members of a society to monitor the design of the 
basic social structure in which all members participate. For Pogge, 
human rights are not about fairness of treatment and consideration 
exclusively, nor are they about designing a specific way of life for all 
of humanity. Pogge’s realistically utopian approach to human rights 
represents a dynamic plan for the establishment of a “single, 
universal criterion of justice which all persons and peoples can 
accept as the basis for moral judgements about the global order and 
about other social institutions with substantial causal effects” 
(Pogge, 2002, p. 33). It is important to note that Pogge was most 
interested in how to achieve another MDG (Pogge, 2004), one 
which focuses on the important and worthwhile task of cutting the 
world’s extreme poverty in half by 2015. It is possible, however, to 
extrapolate the essence of his claim onto the MDG for universal 
primary education for all. On this account then, to qualify educa-
tion as a human rights claim, it must be a vital concern relevant to 
humans, to all and only humans, and must be sufficient to outweigh 
other concerns that may also require action. Basic primary educa-
tion is clearly a vital concern relevant to all humans, and it is a 
claim that can be made regardless of economic or social status. The 
external attachments, group memberships, or social conventions 
to which a child belongs should have no bearing on the ability of 
that child to benefit from claiming a right to basic primary 
education. And yet, clearly there are many instances where these 
attachments, group memberships, and social conventions do affect 
one’s ability to realize one’s right to basic education.
The need to elevate basic primary education to the status of a 
human right rests on the idea that we stand in a certain moral 
relationship to each other— a relation that is outside of any societal 
structure in which we may find ourselves and that makes the claim 
to basic primary education unique and universal. The CRC 
provides a sufficient set of guidelines to assist us in understanding 
this indivisible relationship between one’s education and one’s 
ability to interact socially. By establishing careful limits to the 
scope of a child’s claim to education, we can conclude not only that 
education should clearly be considered a right from which all 
children can benefit but that education is a human right that is both 
intrinsically reasonable and socially indispensible, a conclusion 
that supports the UN challenge to the world to participate in an 
education revolution that would see every child learning and 
participating in a child- centered environment designed to meet 
the individual’s unique needs. Defenders of this global action plan 
suggest that, by embracing such a rights- respecting agenda, 
individual countries will be able to coordinate and improve 
international and national efforts to provide children with the 
skills and knowledge necessary to maximize their personal and 
intellectual development, which, in turn, will maximize each 
individual country’s social and economic returns. Moreover, these 
defenders also suggest that, by embracing the language of rights, as 
outlined in the CRC, it is possible to apply rights to children in an 
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appropriate way. According to defenders of the CRC, it makes no 
sense to talk about civil and political rights children have, because 
they do not have the same direct relationship with their govern-
ment as adults do. Also, it makes no sense to limit children’s rights 
to only those concerned with welfare obligations, because children 
do have a unique status outside of dependency— an individuality, 
an emerging autonomous personhood— that also needs to be 
considered.3
To realize the MDG to achieve free and compulsory basic 
primary education for all, it has been suggested that at least two 
things need to occur. First, the right itself needs to be acknowl-
edged as a right worthy of recognizing and supporting. That is, all 
rights have associated costs (even if they are minimal) that must be 
met for their realization. If a right is real, then the individuals who 
have to bear the burden of the right must be morally compelled to 
act in such a way as to enable the claimant to realize the claim. 
Second, for the right to be meaningful for the claimant, there needs 
to be a social context in which the claimant can do something with 
the right once it has been obtained.
As it has already been suggested, Rawls and Pogge argued that 
everyone has both the capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity 
for a conception of the good. If a society treats all individuals as free 
and equal citizens, and establishes a basic structure built upon the 
principles of justice as fairness, citizens can use these capacities for 
mutual advantage to create a social infrastructure that can produce 
social benefits for everyone and manage those benefits in a fair and 
equitable way. Rawls and Pogge both took this to be the most 
reasonable model for the basic structure of society because not only 
can such a model provide individuals with great opportunities for a 
meaningful life but such a model can provide societies with greater 
opportunities for ongoing prosperity and permanence as well. And 
Pogge introduced the further need to consider human rights as 
ethical guidelines for the actions of all members of a society to 
monitor the design of the basic social structure in which all 
members participate to ensure that this structure is not arbitrarily 
unjust. To this end, children must be seen as citizens in training, 
and their education must reflect and encourage these ideals of 
social justice. An acceptance of a universal right to education can 
lead to the obvious benefits of economic efficiency and improve-
ments in social welfare. More important, however, an acceptance of 
a universal right to education can enable a person to enjoy and to 
participate in the culture of her society as well. Ultimately, however, 
an acceptance of a universal right to education can lead to the main 
benefit that Rawls and Pogge suggest can be derived from partici-
pating in a public system of education: the ability to coordinate 
with others for mutual social advantage.
This conclusion provides a comprehensive explication for the 
need to reflect on both social institutions in general and on the 
specific causal effects that we bring to bear upon those social 
institutions in particular. This also provides a morally compelling 
justification for why we should make every effort to participate in, 
and to maintain, just social institutions and what effect this kind of 
active justice- seeking participation can have on achieving more 
equitable and just societies. Moreover, this conception of global 
social justice suitably addresses the concern often associated with 
the notion that while it is important to understand the obligations 
we have toward others, such an understanding will only be 
applicable to all individuals if there is also an understanding of why 
we have these obligations in the first place— namely an understand-
ing of moral human rights. But one thing that seems to be missing 
to any adequate degree is an account of how individuals, even 
influential ones, develop the capabilities to act on this knowledge.
The Social Context for Education for All Qualified
Advocates of Education for All (Colclough, 2002; UNICEF, 2009; 
Watkins, 2010) recommend, first, the obvious need to secure the 
political will to bring about such reforms, like securing full 
ratification of the CRC (including from the United States). They 
also recommend that citizens should be included as active, 
participating agents in these reforms. Such an approach requires a 
model for institutional reform that not only compels us to reflect 
upon the design of social institutions but also compels us to reflect 
on the capabilities that individuals actually have to contribute to 
just institutions. Amartya Sen is a prominent voice in this regard. 
Sen, like Pogge, is keenly interested in how to eradicate unjust 
inequities and to champion human rights, but he approaches this 
goal from the perspective of what individuals can do with the rights 
and resources that are available to them. With this in mind, he 
contended that, while it is correct to have concern for how certain 
institutional structures can deprive individuals of their basic rights, 
it is equally important to look to achieving certain levels of basic 
capabilities, below which people count as “scandalously deprived” 
(Sen, 1993, p. 41). To this end, it is necessary to examine the role 
institutions play in securing the child’s right to education, and 
consideration needs to be given to a concept of human develop-
ment through education as well (e.g., Alkire, 2002, 2005; Berges, 
2007; Robeyns, 2006; Saito, 2003). According to Sen, having a right 
is only significant if that right enables you to do something which 
you value (Sen, 1993). By focusing on Sen’s notion of freedom or 
capability as the proper content of rights in this regard, it is possible 
to deepen our understanding, in particular, of education as a 
human right because Sen develops an important understanding of 
human capabilities and translates this understanding into a 
capability- sensitive educational framework— a framework that, 
according to Sen (2003b), embraces an old Bengali suggestion:
Knowledge is a very special commodity: the more you give away, the 
more you have left. Imparting education not only enlightens the 
receiver, but also broadens the giver— the teachers, the parents, the 
friends. Schooling not only benefits the person being schooled, but also 
others who are close to those who are being schooled. Basic education 
is a truly social good, which people can share and from which they can 
jointly benefit, without having to snatch it from others. (p. 21)
Sen recommended, “One of the characteristics of human 
agency is the ability to scrutinize and re- examine our values and 
priorities in light of fresh information and new understanding. The 
process of institutional reform depends on such scrutiny and 
critique” (Sen & Anand, 1996, p. 25). Where many place the burden 
of institutional reform on the obligation of some to achieve secure 
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access for all to a universal set of fundamental rights, Sen recom-
mended the additional stipulation that, while having these rights is 
essential to our well- being, they will only be effective in influencing 
our standard of living if individuals themselves are in a position to 
do something with those rights. Thus, Sen’s focus is more on 
individual empowerment, as opposed to being a strategic plea to 
the powers- that- be.
For Sen, one’s level of empowerment can be identified in 
more than one way— most obviously through the assessment of 
one’s ability to secure basic necessities or rights. Most important, 
though, is the assessment of one’s ability to convert these necessi-
ties into meaningful action. The value of this approach comes 
from looking beyond the question of whether or not we have 
fulfilled our duty not to interfere with the choices of others to 
considering whether the choices that people make are genuine 
choices— that is, choices that enable them to achieve what they 
value. Sen (1992) claimed that “a right gives a person a certain 
opportunity” (p. 141). Importantly, he added to this a caution that 
we also need to understand what capabilities are necessary to 
convert these rights into something meaningful and enabling. On 
this account, if we have real opportunities, we can achieve certain 
“functionings” (Dreze & Sen, 1995, p. 10), or beings and doings, 
that we value (like being nourished, being educated, or being 
confident to participate actively in our own social environment). 
Sen defined capability, then, as “the alternative combinations of 
functionings from which a person can choose. Thus the notion of 
capability is essentially one of freedom— the range of options a 
person has in deciding what kind of life to lead” (Dreze & Sen, 
1995, pp. 10– 11; see also Sen, 1984).
An emphasis on capabilities, or open- ended freedoms, in this 
way is important because not only do they enable individuals to be 
able to achieve a certain level of well- being, they distinguish having 
a certain standard of living from the value that can be gained from 
achieving that standard. For example, Sen suggested that, if you 
consider two people with identical functionings in a certain 
respect— they are both starving, say— the correct thing to do, if you 
are able, is to offer them some food. If you discover that one person 
is starving because that person lives in a country that is experienc-
ing a famine, and the other is fasting to make a political statement, 
how you respond to this additional information is significant (Sen, 
1985). Education ought to be accessible to every child. Having a 
right to education, however, does not mean having a right to the 
same education for all; it means having the same right for all to an 
education. The inclusion of the element of compulsion is necessary, 
not to penalize directly those countries that are incapable of 
fulfilling this goal but to highlight the nonoptional interdependent 
nature of basic primary education and the need to increase the 
level of awareness with regard to “international assistance and 
cooperation” (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 1999, pt. 9) to achieve this end. Similarly, the inclusion of 
the child’s right to access a high- quality education within a 
framework that is flexible to meet each child’s unique needs is not 
to burden educational systems inappropriately. The inclusion of 
this right to access is to highlight the nonoptional nature of the 
child’s right to education. Even in countries that have 
well- established educational programs, many children cannot 
realize their right to education because they are members of a 
group that is marginalized within its own society. To achieve the 
UN goal of education for all, however, consideration must be given 
to all children, including those children who have traditionally 
been hard to reach. This includes (but is not limited to): girls, 
especially in predominately patriarchal societies; rural children, 
who might not have the means to get themselves to school; ethnic 
minorities or indigenous groups who do not speak the common 
language taught at school; children with disabilities; children who 
do not officially belong to a school district because they are without 
a permanent address; and children caught in armed conflict.
In light of this, it is important to consider Sen’s belief that the 
unfreedoms that an individual may suffer arise from two sources: 
inadequate processes and inadequate opportunities. While it is 
essential to analyze the social processes that we engage in, we must 
also develop fully the two- way relationship between processes and 
opportunities, a relationship which Sen argued is necessary for 
effective human agency and development. According to Sen, 
people often have adapted preferences, which might indicate that 
they are experiencing an improvement in their standard of living 
but that, in reality, reflect false improvements because these 
improvements bear no meaning on their actual situation or 
circumstances. A good example of this is the case of the right to 
education for Canadian aboriginal children, who seemed to 
experience an improvement in their standard of living based on the 
Canadian government’s standards but, in reality experienced a 
false increase because they lost so much of the things which were of 
real value to their community. A situation such as this highlights 
the impact that aggregative measurements of a society’s general 
well- being may hide or mask about the true reality of the individu-
als within that society. Moreover, blanket statements of the rights 
that individuals have can also hide or mask the reality of the 
opportunities that an individual has to act on those rights. At the 
very least, the rights talk only begs the further question of how to 
make rights real, and it is here that Sen’s capability theory can add 
importantly to the debate. To determine whether an individual is 
actually experiencing an improvement in her standard of living 
requires a general sense of societal well- being, an understanding of 
the norms to which the society aspires, and the additional informa-
tion to be gained from assessing the real opportunities or freedoms 
that an individual has.
What this capability approach allows is the possibility to move 
beyond the Rawlsian concept of equal liberties for all to a more 
robust concept of freedom that takes the “freedom of individuals as 
the basic building blocks of development” (Sen, 1999, p. 
18)— building blocks that should integrate into a functioning 
whole the personal concerns that an individual has regarding life 
with the general concerns of society. Moreover, on Sen’s recom-
mendation, it is essential that the contingent personal and social 
circumstances, or “parametric variations” (Sen, 1999, p. 88) that are 
unique to individuals, need to be accounted for, and addressed, 
within public policy like that governing education. In a speech that 
Sen delivered to the 2003 Commonwealth education conference in 
Edinburgh, he asked the following question: “Why is it so 
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important to close the educational gaps, and to remove the 
enormous disparities in educational access, inclusion and achieve-
ment” (Sen, 2003a, para. 20)? To this question, Sen responded by 
providing six potent reasons why formal public education is both 
intrinsically and instrumentally important and why the public 
should be interested in supporting it by closing the educational 
gaps that currently exist around the world.
First, Sen highlighted the connection between education and 
security. Human insecurity is related to the obvious insecurities 
that result from the potential physical harms that others can inflict 
upon us, through things like terrorism and violence. But insecurity 
is multidimensional in nature. Not having the basic skills of being 
able to read, write, and calculate imposes insecurities upon 
individuals who are, at the least, equally significant, in that they 
also cause lifelong, inescapable capability deprivations. Not 
everyone is directly affected by terrorism, but all illiterate individu-
als are directly and constantly affected— and negatively so— by 
their lack of skill in this regard. If a country is willing to support the 
military and policing initiatives to protect the physical security of a 
society, then that country should be willing also to support the 
educational initiatives to protect the knowledge- based security of 
that society. Second, Sen highlighted the obvious potential for 
economic empowerment that comes from being literate and 
numerate. Related to this potential for job- skill development, Sen 
suggested further that with literacy comes understanding— a 
notion of understanding that goes beyond the factual information 
typically associated with schooling (like improvements in one’s 
level of social, historical, or geographical awareness) to the 
understanding of the social information typically associated with 
human rights and the concurrent obligations to those rights, which 
should be fulfilled. Fourth, Sen suggested that being able to read is 
essential to being able to participate in political decision- making. 
Fifth, Sen suggested that not only is formal education important for 
political participation, it is essential for accessing a wide variety of 
public services. For example, according to Sen, being educated can 
translate into being able to use, more extensively and more knowl-
edgeably, the available public health services. While providing free 
public education is a significant public burden, maintaining a 
society’s general health and well- being is an equally significant 
encumbrance. If the observable correlation between level of 
education and level of general physical well- being is recognized, 
the indispensable influence that educational opportunities 
(especially those directed toward women) can have on preventative 
health care can go a long way to achieving general sustainable social 
well- being and to alleviating a significant portion of the public 
health burden. And finally, he highlighted the significance of 
recognizing the benefits to be gained from demanding that women 
receive the same educational opportunities as men. While it is true 
that having an education is highly relevant to men, because often 
men take on the role of economic provider for the family, this 
reality does not diminish the need to recognize the relevance of 
having an education to women. It is the women, after all, who often 
carry the burden of being the prime role model and mentor to 
children, especially in the formative years. If the education of 
women is not taken to be of equal significance to that of men, then 
the potential for all children (male and female) to benefit from a 
comprehensive set of capabilities is diminished.
Conclusion
The claim that a right to education is a human right is an impor-
tant claim. It is an important claim because there is a responsibil-
ity to enable children to develop an acquired set of capabilities to 
lead their own lives in a meaningful and fulfilling way. UNESCO’s 
aim to construct a 21st- century learning society by promoting the 
MDG to achieve free universal basic primary public education for 
all by 2015 is both an important and a worthwhile objective. 
Currently almost 70 million children of primary school age do 
not, or cannot, attend school— a staggering statistic that suggests 
that the establishment of a right to education is a high- priority 
claim in today’s world.
The establishment and maintenance of a stable society 
depends on social norms and institutions that all members can 
accept as reasonable without unnecessarily distorting their own 
sense of justice in the process. This understanding of the basic 
structure of society is important because it can achieve two things. 
First, it can deepen our understanding of the role institutions 
should play in the creation, and maintenance, of a mutually 
beneficial, rights- respecting social infrastructure. Second, it can 
deepen our understanding of why we should be morally motivated 
to recognize and support these institutions.
Typically, the institutions that are deemed to be essential to a 
society are institutions that govern property, security, politics, and 
the economy, but I have argued that education is an essential 
institution as well. Education plays a large role in achieving just 
societies because education can develop a child’s sense of self, sense 
of community, and sense of citizenship. While it is true that the 
provision of education is costly and multifaceted, a public institu-
tion of education needs to be in place to manage the kinds of 
educational opportunities that are available and to secure the kinds 
of resources that are necessary. A human- rights approach stipulates 
that there is a duty on the part of all governments, especially 
wealthy governments, to influence and support the institutional 
reforms necessary to achieve at least the provision of free basic 
primary education for all children— an important claim but one 
that cannot stand alone. It cannot stand alone because it fails to 
address adequately those cases where children are said to have a 
right to education but are unable to act on that right.
To address this concern requires the insight to be gained from 
the capability approach, which accounts for the further responsibil-
ity on the part of all individuals to ensure that the kinds of educa-
tional reforms that governments undertake can provide children 
with the freedom to act on their rights. Thus, to achieve the MDG 
of free compulsory basic primary education for all requires the 
active involvement both of official channels as represented by 
advocates of human rights and of civil society as represented by the 
actions of interested and involved individuals. So, while it is 
important to secure and protect a right to education, it is equally 
important to be able to convert this right into meaningful action. 
Having rights is only effective in influencing an individual’s 
standard of living if that individual can do something with that 
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right as well. Thus, to implement fully a global human right to 
education, we must have an unyielding commitment to capabilities 
as the proper content of children’s rights and be encouraged to look 
beyond securing rights to determine whether an individual is 
actually experiencing an improvement in standard of living. That 
is, we must seek out a deeper understanding of the norms to which 
a society aspires. Also, we must seek out a richer measure of 
existing states of affairs.4 Finally, a commitment to capabilities 
encourages us to seek functional solutions that can assist children 
in achieving a level of well- being that is of value to them because it 
enables them to act on the rights that they have within the societies 
in which they exist.
Of course, the desire to make basic primary public education 
free to all is a demanding goal economically, socially, and cultur-
ally. A simple suggestion is to forcefully restate the need to ratify 
fully the CRC. Although this suggestion is largely symbolic, it is 
worthwhile because the United States is one of the remaining two 
countries who have yet to sign (the other being Somalia). Given 
that the United States is as powerful and influential as it is, its 
endorsement is significant. With regard to its own domestic 
responsibilities to the establishment of a stable and supportive 
system of education for its children, the significance of full 
ratification may have a limited effect. With regard to the responsi-
bilities to the MDG to achieve free and universal basic primary 
education for all children, however, the significance of full ratifica-
tion is noteworthy for a variety of reasons. Full ratification would 
represent: a universal acknowledgement of children’s rights; a 
universal acknowledgement of the need for greater awareness of 
and accountability to the plight of all children; greater opportuni-
ties for resource sharing; and most important, a universal endorse-
ment of the key role that education plays in the development of 
children and societies.
A more complex suggestion is to look beyond the symbolic 
act of full ratification of the CRC toward individual public actions. 
To answer the question “How should public action be directed to 
respond to the UN claim that education is a fundamental human 
right to which all children are entitled?” it is essential to recognize 
that basic primary education is a fundamental right that is of equal 
significance to the traditionally accepted rights to security and 
political freedom. This is so, because education is necessary for 
both individual initiative and social effectiveness. Further, I have 
argued that to realize this right to education for all in a meaningful 
and manageable way requires a model of institutional reform that 
motivates us to reflect upon the design of social institutions and 
upon the capabilities individuals have to contribute to those social 
institutions. The challenge for the 21st century is to establish a new 
human rights perspective from outside of the bowels of interna-
tional law and governance— a perspective that takes education to 
be a vital human rights object that is as significant to an individual 
as is food or freedom but that is also significant to society as an 
indispensable means of realizing sustainable development, 
prosperity, and permanence. It is not enough simply to defend the 
child’s right to access education— one must defend the child’s right 
to an education, which is focused on the need to develop the child’s 
own autonomy and potential for independence and individual 
action both within the immediate society to which the child 
belongs and within the global society in which the child will 
interact.
Notes
1. In conjunction with other documents like Article 26 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Principle 7 of the 
Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), Articles 7 
and 10 of the European Social Charter (1961) (and 17 in the revised 
ESCR), Articles 10 and 11 of the UN Declaration Regarding Social 
Progress and Development (1969), and Articles 17 and 25 of the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981).
2. This is a revised statement of the principles of justice found in 
Rawls (1971), 52– 78.
3. This is an important and complex topic worthy of another 
paper as it is beyond the scope of the current topic at hand.
4. Like the Human Development Index (HDI), United Nations 
Development Programme, Defining	and	Measuring	Human	
Development. (New York: Oxford University Press 1990). See also 
UNDP website at http://hdr.undp.org/en
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